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Abstract
We use laboratory experiments to test models of rational inattention, in which
people acquire information to maximize utility from subsequent choices net of infor-
mation costs. We show that subjects adjust their attention in response to changes in
incentives a manner which is broadly in line with the rational inattention model but
which violates models such as random utility in which attention is xed. However, our
results are not consistent with information costs based on Shannon entropy, as is often
assumed in applied work. We nd more support for a class of posterior separablecost
functions which generalize the Shannon model.
1 Introduction
Attention is a scarce resource. The impact of attentional limits has been identied in many
important economic settings.1 The importance of limits on attention has lead to a wide range
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1For example, shoppers may buy unnecessarily expensive products due to their failure to notice whether
or not sales tax is included in stated prices (Chetty et al. [2009]). Buyers of second-hand cars focus their
attention on the leftmost digit of the odometer (Lacetera et al. [2012]). Purchasers limit their attention to
a relatively small number of websites when buying over the internet (Santos et al. [2012]).
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of modeling approaches aimed at understanding behavior under such constraints. Particu-
larly inuential are models of rational inattention2 which assume that people choose the
information they attend to in order to maximize the expected utility of subsequent choices
net of informational costs.3
The widespread use of the rational inattention model leads to a number of natural research
questions. First, do people in fact actively adjust their attention in response to incentives?
Second, do they do so in line with the predictions of the rational inattention model? Third,
what do the costs of attention look like? Fourth, how much heterogeneity in information
costs is there in the population?
In this paper we use a sequence of four laboratory experiment to provide answers to these
questions. The basic set up is a simple information acquisition task in which subjects are
presented with a number of balls on the screen which can either be red or blue. They must
then choose between di¤erent actions, the payo¤ of which depend on the fraction of balls
which are red (which we will call the state of the world). The prior probability of each
state is known to the subject. There is no time limit or extrinsic cost of information in the
experiment, so if subjects face no intrinsic cost of information acquisition the experiment
would be trivial: they would simply ascertain the number of red balls on the screen and
choose the best action given this state. As we shall see, subjects in general do not behave
in this way.
Within this setup the four experiments vary di¤erent features of the decision problem,
including the range of available actions, the value of correct choice and the prior probability
of possible states. By repeatedly exposing the subject to each decision problem we can collect
state dependent stochastic choice(SDSC) data, or the probability that each action is chosen
in each state. Such data is particularly useful for testing models of rational inattention, and
learning about attention cost (see Caplin and Dean [2015]).
In order to answer the four questions above, we rely on several recent theoretical advances.
Caplin and Martin [2015b] and Caplin and Dean [2015] provide necessary and su¢ cient con-
ditions for SDSC to be consistent with a general model of rational inattention which is
agnostic about information costs (henceforth the general model). The No Improving Action
Switches (NIAS) condition ensures that choice of action is optimal given the information
2We will use the term rational attentionto describe this entire model class, while recognizing that others
use this term to refer to the specic case when costs are based on the Shannon mutual information between
prior and posterior beliefs. Our denition covers almost all models of costly information acqusition, as we
discuss in section 2.2. We refer to the latter as the Shannon model.
3Recent examples include Sims [2003], van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp [2009], Hellwig et al. [2012],
Matejka and McKay [2015] and Caplin and Dean [2015].
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gathered, while the No Improving Attention Cycle (NIAC) condition ensures that the allo-
cation of attention across decision problems can be rationalized by some cost function. Using
this revealed costapproach, bounds can be placed on the costs associated with di¤erent
information structures.
Complementary to this agnostic approach to attention costs, we also ask whether our data
is in line with specic cost functions. Here we focus on costs which are linear in Shannon mu-
tual information (henceforth the Shannon model), which was introduced to the economics
literature by Sims [2003], and has proved extremely popular in subsequent empirical and
theoretical work.4 The use of mutual information costs has been justied on information
theoretic grounds, related as they are to the average number of signals needed to generate a
given set of posterior beliefs (see Sims [2003]). Compared to the general model, the Shannon
model is extremely restrictive, with only a single parameter related to the marginal cost of
information. Recent works by Matejka and McKay [2015] and Caplin et al. [2017]5 have
highlighted a number of behavioral regularities implied by the Shannon model: The Locally
Invariant Posteriors (LIP) and Invariant Likelihood Ratio (ILR) conditions restrict how op-
timal information acquisition responds to changes in prior beliefs and incentives respectively.
The Shannon model also implies that behavior is invariant to the addition or subtraction of
states which are identical in terms of the payo¤s of all available actions - a property labeled
Invariance Under Compression (IUC) by Caplin et al. [2017]. This property means the model
is incommensurate with any notion of perceptual distance, by which some states are easier
to di¤erentiate than others. Because the Shannon model is so restrictive, we also consider
an intermediate class of posterior separablemodels, introduced by Caplin and Dean [2013],
which retain the LIP feature of the Shannon models, but relaxes other implications. Models
in this class have recently been used for several economic applications (see for example Clark
[2016] and Morris and Strack [2017]).
Experiment 1 is designed to distinguish rational inattention from models in which atten-
tion is unresponsive but choice is stochastic - including random utility (Block and Marschak
[1960]) and signal detection theory (Green and Swets [1966]). The key observation is that
these alternative models imply the property of Monotonicity: adding alternatives to the
choice set cannot increase the probability of choosing previously available options. This
property is not implied by models of rational inattention, and Matejka and McKay [2015]
describe a scenario in which informational spillovers could lead a rationally inattentive de-
cision maker to violate monotonicity. We provide an experimental implementation and nd
4See for example the application of the model to investment decisions (e.g Mondria [2010]), global games
(Yang [2015]), and pricing decisions (Mackowiak and Wiederholt [2009], Matµejka [2016], Martin [2017]).
5See also Caplin and Dean [2013].
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that monotonicity is strongly rejected by the data in a manner broadly consistent with ra-
tional inattention (as characterized by the NIAS and NIAC conditions), indicating the need
for models in this class.
Experiment 2 examines the response of information acquisition to incentives using a
simple two state/two action design in which we vary the benet from choosing the correct
action. This provides a simple test of the NIAC and NIAS conditions, in an admittedly
undemanding setting. The aggregate data strongly supports both conditions, and at the
individual level 81% of subjects exhibit no signicant violation of either. This implies that
there is a notion of information costs which rationalizes the behavior of the majority of
subjects. We nd a high degree of heterogeneity in these costs across subjects. We also ask
whether the responsiveness of our subjects to changes in incentives is consistent with the
Shannon model, and nd that the answer is largely negative. Both in the aggregate and
at the individual level we nd that subjects typically respond less strongly than predicted
by Shannon costs. Behavior is better matched by a simple, two parameter extension of the
Shannon model in the posterior separable class.
Experiment 3 looks at the reaction of behavior to changes in prior beliefs, again in a
simple two state/two action setting. This provides us both with a more sophisticated test of
the NIAS condition, and a test of the LIP condition which characterizes the class of posterior
separable model. The former condition is largely satised, both at the aggregate and the
individual level - in particular we nd little evidence of base rate neglect in our subjects
choices. The evidence for the LIP condition is more mixed, but some aspects of the data do
agree with this more stringent condition.
Our nal experiment tests IUC using a design with multiple states but only two acts to
choose from, the payo¤ of which is the same in many di¤erent states. The Shannon model
implies that behavior should be the same in all states in which both actions pay the same
amount. This is incommensurate with the idea of a perceptual distance, by which some states
are easier to di¤erentiate between than others. We show that, in our baseline experimental
set up which has a natural notion of perceptual distance, IUC performs poorly. However, in
an alternative setting based on letter recognition, it provides a reasonable approximation of
behavior.
Our paper provides an empirical counterpart to the large recent theoretical literature on
limited attention, which includes both the rational inattention models discussed above and
other approaches in which attention is not modelled as the result of an optimizing process
(for example Masatlioglu et al. [2012], Manzini and Mariotti [2014], Lleras et al. [2017]). To
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our knowledge there is surprisingly little experimental work testing such models. Notable
exceptions include Gabaix et al. [2006], Caplin et al. [2011], Taubinsky [2013] and Khaw et al.
[2016]. These papers are designed to test models which are very di¤erent to those we consider
here, and as such make use of very di¤erent data. Pinkovskiy [2009] and Cheremukhin et al.
[2015] t the Shannon model using data on stochastic choice between lotteries, but do not
test the sharp behavioral predictions from that model as we do here. Barto et al. [2016]
report the results of a eld experiment which supports rationally inattentive behavior in
labor and housing markets. More broadly, our work ts in to a recent move to use richer
data to understand the process of information acquisition (for example Krajbich et al. [2010],
Brocas et al. [2014], Polonio et al. [2015], and Caplin and Martin [2015a]). In contrast to the
relatively small literature in economics, there is a huge literature in psychology that examines
behavior in perceptual tasks which are similar to some of our experiments, though the data
is analyzed in very di¤erent ways (for example see Ratcli¤ et al. [2016] for a recent review,
and Krajbich et al. [2011] for an application to economic decision making). We discuss our
relationship to these papers in section 6.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the theory underlying our exper-
iments. Section 3 describes the experimental design in detail. Section 4 provides results,
section 5 provides additional discussion, and section 6 describes the related literature.
2 Theory
2.1 Set-Up and Data
For our discussion of the testable implications of the rational inattention model we use the
set up and notation of Caplin and Dean [2015].
We consider a decision maker (DM) who chooses among actions, the outcomes of which
depend on which of a nite number of states of the world ! 2 
 occurs. The utility of action
a in state of the world ! is denoted by u(a; !):
A decision problem is dened by a set of available actions A and a prior over states of
the world  2 (
), both of which we assume can be chosen by the experimenter. The data
observed from a particular decision problem is a state dependent stochastic choice (SDSC)
function, which describes the probability of choosing each available action in each state of the
world. For a decision problem (;A) we use P(;A) to refer to the associated SDSC function,
with P(;A)(aj!) the probability that action a 2 A was chosen in state ! 2 
 (where it will
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not cause confusion, we will suppress the subscript on P ). Note that a SDSC function also
implies a posterior probability distribution over states, a, associated with each action a 2 A
which is chosen with positive probability. By Bayesrule we have
a(!) = P (!ja) = (!)P (aj!)P
!02
 (!
0)P (aj!0) : (1)
This construct will be useful in testing the various theories we discuss below.
2.2 The Rational Inattention Model
The rational inattention model assumes that the DM can gather information about the state
of the world prior to choosing an action. Importantly, they can choose what information to
gather conditional on the decision problem they are facing. The DM must trade o¤ the costs
of information acquisition against the benets of better subsequent choices. The rational
inattention model assumes that the DM solves this trade o¤ optimally.
In each decision problem, the DM chooses an information structure: a stochastic mapping
from objective states of the world to a set of subjective signals. While this formalization
sounds somewhat abstract, its subsumes the vast majority of models of optimal information
acquisition that have been proposed (see Caplin and Dean [2015]). Note that we assume
that the subjects choice of information structure is not observed, and so has to be inferred
from their choice data.
Having selected an information structure, the DM can condition choice of action only on
these signals. For notational convenience we identify each signal with its associated posterior
beliefs  2  , which is equivalent to the subjective information state of the DM following
the receipt of that signal. Feasible information structures satisfy Bayesrule, so for any prior
 the set of possible structures () comprises all mappings  : 
!( ) that have nite
support  ()    and that satisfy Bayesrule, meaning that for all ! 2 
 and  2  (),








where (j!) is the probability of signal  given state ! and (!) is the probability of state
! conditional on receiving signal .
We assume that there is a cost associated with the use of each information structure,
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with K(; ) denoting the cost of information structure  given prior . We dene G as
the gross payo¤ of using a particular information structure in a particular decision problem.

















Here the rst bracketed term is the probability of each signal, and the second is the maximum
achievable expected utility from alternatives in A given the resulting beliefs.
The rational inattention model assumes that the decision maker choose actions in order to
maximize utility given information, and chooses information structures to maximize utility
net of costs, i.e.
G(;A; ) K(; )
We do not a priori rule out the possibility that the cost of some information structures is
innite, meaning that this formalization can cope with models in which the DM is restricted
to choosing certain types of information structure (for example normal signals).6 Note the
cost function K is essentially a high-dimentional free parameter in this model.
Caplin and Dean [2015] provide necessary and su¢ cient conditions on SDSC data such
that there exists some cost function which rationalizes the observed pattern of behavior. We
call this the general model of rational inattention. TheNo Improving Action Switches (NIAS)
condition, introduced by Caplin and Martin [2015b], ensures that choices are consistent with
e¢ cient use of whatever information the DM has. It states that, for any action a which
is chosen with positive probability, it must be that a maximizes expected utility given a
- the posterior distribution associated with that act. The No Improving Attention Cycles
(NIAC) condition ensures that choice of information itself is rationalizable according to some
underlying cost function. It relies on the concept of a revealed information structure, which
can be recovered from the data by assuming that each chosen action is associated with exactly
one signal.7 Essentially, NIAC states that the total gross value of information (measured by
G) in a collection of decision problems cannot be increased by switching revealed information
structures between those problems.
In the interests of brevity, we do not provide a formal denition of NIAS or NIAC here
6Though we do rule out costs being innte for all information costs so that optimization is well dened.
7Note that we do not require that this is true in the underlying model. Caplin and Dean [2015] show
that constructing a revealed information structure in this manner is enough to test all models in the rational
inattention class.
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(we refer the interested reader to Caplin and Dean [2015]). Instead we will describe in
section 3 how these conditions apply to our specic experiments. However, we highlight one
important structural feature: because the general model allows costs to be indexed by priors
in an arbitrary way, it puts no restriction on behavior as prior changes, only as the set of
available actions change.
We emphasize that the exibility in the choice of the function K means that general
model includes as special cases almost all models of optimal costly information acquisition
that have been discussed in the literature, including those in which agents can either pay to
receive information or not,8 those that apply additive normal noise to the agents information
and then allows them to pay a cost to decrease the variance of that noise,9 or those in which
the decision maker chooses a partition structure on the state space.10 See Caplin and Dean
[2015] for a discussion.
2.2.1 Rational Inattention vs Other Models of Stochastic Choice
Rational inattention is, of course, not the only model which allows for stochasticity in choice.
Two highly inuential alternatives are the random utility model (Block and Marschak [1960],
McFadden [1974], Gul and Pesendorfer [2006]) and Signal Detection Theory (Green and
Swets [1966]). Here we describe how these can be di¤erentiated from rational inattention.
The random utility model (RUM) assumes that people have many possible utility func-
tions which may govern their choice. On any given trial one of these utility functions is
selected according to some probability distribution, and the DM will choose in order to max-
imize that function. Stochasticity therefore derives from changes in preferences, rather than
noise in the perception of the state of the world.
Typically the RUM has not been applied to situations in which there is an objective,
observable state of the world, and there are many possible ways that the model could be
adapted to such a situation.11 However, as long as we maintain the assumption that the DM
does not actively change their choice of information in response to the decision problem, all
variants of the RUM will imply the property of Monotonicity. This states that adding new
alternatives to the choice set cannot increase the probability of an existing alternative being
chosen:
8For example Grossman and Stiglitz [1980], Barlevy and Veronesi [2000] and Reis [2006].
9For example Verrecchia [1982] and Hellwig et al. [2012] .
10For example Robson [2001] and Ellis [2013].
11For example, the DM could be fully informed about the underlying state, have no information about the
state, or receive a noisy signal regarding the state.
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Denition 1 A SDSC satises Monotonicity if, for every  2 (




That Monotonicity is a necessary property of data generated by random utility models is
intuitively obvious: Adding new alternatives to a set A can only (weakly) reduce the set of
utility functions for which any a 2 A is optimal. However, Monotonicity is not implied by
rational inattention models, as illustrated by Matejka and McKay [2015]. The introduction
of a new act can increase the incentives to information acquisition, which may in turn lead the
DM to learn that an existing act was of high value. Matejka and McKay [2015] demonstrate
that the Shannon model will always generate a violation of Monotonicity across some decision
problems. We make use of this insight in Experiment 1.
Signal Detection Theory (SDT) is popular model in the psychological literature on per-
ception and choice. Essentially it assumes that people receive a noisy signal about the state
of the world, then choose actions optimally given subsequent beliefs. As such, it is a special
case of the general model in which the costs of all but one information structure are in-
nite. A subject behaving according to SDT will therefore satisfy NIAC and NIAS. However,
they will also satisfy Monotonicity: as information selection cannot adjust, the only way
that adding a new option can a¤ect choice is by being chosen instead of one of the existing
options upon the receipt of some signal. Thus a violation of Monotonicity rules out SDT as
well as random utility.
2.3 The Shannon Model
The general model is completely agnostic about the form of information costs.12 However,
for many applied purposes, specic cost functions are assumed. One of the most popular
approaches is to base costs on the Shannon mutual information between states and signals.
Introduced to the economics literature by Sims [2003], Shannon costs can be justied on
axiomatic or information theoretic grounds, and have been widely applied in the subsequent
literature.
Mutual information costs have the following form










 (!)(j!) is the unconditional probability of signal  and H() =P
!2 (!) ln (!) is the Shannon entropy of distribution .13 Mutual information can
therefore be seen as the expected reduction in entropy due to the observation of signals from
the information structure.
Clearly, the Shannon model puts much more structure on information costs than the
general model as it has essentially one degree of freedom: the marginal cost of mutual
information governed by . This in turn means that the Shannon model puts much tighter
restrictions on behavior than the general model. These restrictions have been discussed in
several recent papers (particularly Caplin and Dean [2013], Matejka and McKay [2015] and
Caplin et al. [2017]). In this paper we shall concern ourselves with three implications of
the Shannon model: Invariant Likelihood Ratio, Locally Invariant Posteriors and Invariance
Under Compression.
The Invariant Likelihood Ratio (ILR) property (Caplin and Dean [2013]) states that for
any two chosen actions, the posterior probabilities about a particular state conditional on






As we shall see in the discussion of experiment 2 below, this puts tight restrictions on
the way in which information acquisition can change with the rewards for doing so.
The Locally Invariant Posterior (LIP) property states that local changes in prior beliefs do
not lead to changes in optimal posterior beliefs.14 Specically, if, for some decision problem
(;A), the associated SDSC reveals some set of posteriors faga2A, and we change the prior
to some 0 in such a way that these posteriors are still feasible (i.e. 0 is in the convex hull
of faga2A), the LIP property states that precisely these posteriors should also be used in
the decision problem (0; A). We will test this proposition in experiment 3.
ILR shows that, according to the Shannon model, posterior beliefs depend only of the
payo¤s of actions in a particular state, not on any other features of the state. This implies
that behavior should not be a¤ected by adding or subtracting states which are identical in
payo¤ terms for all acts. Caplin et al. [2017] show that this Invariance Under Compres-
sionproperty fully characterizes the Shannon model within a the broader class of posterior
separable models described below. Behaviorally, one implication of this is that the Shan-
13Recall that we identify a signal with its resulting posterior ditribution.
14Again, see Caplin and Dean [2013] and Caplin et al. [2017] for further details.
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non model lacks any notion of perceptual distance: that some states might be harder to
di¤erentiate than others. We test this implication in experiment 4.
2.4 Posterior Separable Information Costs
So far we have considered only the general model, with completely unconstrained costs, and
the Shannon model, in which costs are completely pinned down. An intermediate class of
models, introduced in Caplin and Dean [2013], is dened by posterior separableinformation
costs. These models keep the structure of Shannon mutual information, but relax the precise
functional form. Specically, posterior separable cost functions are those that can be written
as
KT (; ) =
24 X
2 ()
()T ()  T ()
35
for some strictly convex function T:15 Posterior separable cost functions satisfy LIP, but
not necessarily ILR or IUC. They can therefore allow for di¤erent elasticities of attention
with respect to incentives as well as the possibility of di¤erent perceptual di¤erences between
states.
One type of posterior separable cost function that we will t to the experimental data is










if  6= 1 and  6= 2;
 
PM
m=1 m ln m








if  = 2:
;
were m is the posterior probability of state m. If there are only two states of the world,










if  6= 1;





 1 + (1  1) 

15In Caplin et al. [2016] this class of models is refered to as uniformly posterior separableto di¤erentiate
them from a broader class of models in which the function T is allowed to vary with the prior.
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We use this class of functions because they provide a simple and easy to estimate way of
generalizing the Shannon model to allow for extra exibility in the response of attention
to incentives, similar to the way that constant relative risk aversion generalizes log utility:
note that the second derivative of these costs functions is continuous in , with the Shannon
entropy cost function tting smoothly into the parametric class at  = 1.
3 Experimental Design
3.1 Set Up
We now introduce our experimental design which produces state dependent stochastic choice
data for each subject.
Figure 1: Typical Screenshot
In a typical question in the experiment, a subject is shown a screen on which there are
displayed 100 balls, some of which are red and some of which are blue. The state of the
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world is determined by the number of red balls on the screen. Prior to seeing the screen,
subjects are informed of the probability distribution over such states. Having seen the screen,
they choose from a number of di¤erent actions whose payo¤s are state dependent. As in
the theory, a decision problem is dened by this prior distribution and the set of available
actions. Figure 1 shows a typical screenshot from the experiment.
A subject faces each decision problem multiple times, allowing us to approximate their
state dependent stochastic choice function. In any given experiment, the subject faces several
di¤erent problems. All occurrences of the same problem are grouped, but the order of the
problems is block-randomized. At the end of the experiment, one decision problem is selected
at random for payment.
There are several things to note about our experimental design. First there is no external
limit (such as a time constraint) on a subjects ability to collect information about the state
of the world. If they so wished, subjects could determine the state with a very high level of
precision in each question by precisely counting the number of red balls - a very small number
of subjects do just this. We are therefore not studying hard limits to a subjects perceptual
ability to determine the state, as is traditional in many psychology experiments (see section
6 for a discussion). At the same time, there is no extrinsic cost to the subject of gathering
information. Therefore the extent to which subjects fail to discern the true state of the world
is due to their unwillingness to trade cognitive e¤ort and time for better information, and
so higher payo¤s.16
Second, in order to estimate the state dependent stochastic choice function we treat
the multiple times that a subject faces the same decision making environment as multiple
independent repetitions of the same decision problem. To prevent subjects from learning to
recognize patterns, we randomize the position of the balls. The implicit assumption is that
the perceptual cost of determining the state is the same for each possible conguration of
balls. We discuss this assumption further in section 4.1.
Third, in experiments where it is important, we pay subjects in probability pointsrather
than money - i.e. subjects are paid in points which increase the probability of winning a
monetary prize. We do so in order to get round the problem that utility itself is not directly
observable. This is not a problem if utility is linearly related to the quantity of whatever
we use to pay subjects. Expected utility theory implies that utility is linear in probability
points but not monetary amounts.
16Subjects had a xed number of tasks to complete during the course of the experiment. They were told
that when they had completed the experiment they had to stay in the lab until all subjects had nished the
experiment.
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An example of the experimental instructions can be found in the online appendix.
3.2 Experiment 1: Testing for Responsive Attention
Experiment 1 is designed to elicit violations of Monotonicity, which therefore also violate
the predictions of the RUM and SDT. Based on a thought experiment discussed in Matejka
and McKay [2015], the design requires subjects to take part in two decision problems (DP)
described in table 1 below. Payment was in probability points with a prize of $20. Each
subject faces 75 repetitions of each DP.
Table 1: Experiment 1
Payo¤s
DP U(a; 1) U(a; 2) U(b; 1) U(b; 2) U(c; 1) U(c; 2)
1 50 50 b1 b2 n/a n/a
2 50 50 b1 b2 100 0
The structure of the two DP is as follows. There are two equally likely states of the world
- 1 and 2 (represented by 49 and 51 red balls respectively). In DP 1, the subject has the
choice between the sure-thing option a, which pays 50 probability points, and an option b
which pays o¤ less than a in state 1, but more in state 2 (i.e. b1 < 50 < b2). However, b1
and b2 are chosen to be relatively close to 50. We used 4 di¤erent values for b1 and b2 as
described in table 2.







The incentive for gathering information in DP 1 is low. The subject can simply choose a
and guarantee that they will receive 50 points. If they try to determine the state then half
the time they will nd out that it is highly likely to be 1, in which case a is better than
b. Even if they do nd out that the state is highly likely to be 2 the additional payo¤ over
simply choosing a is low. Thus, for many information cost functions, the optimal strategy
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for DP 1 will be to remain uninformed and select a.
In DP 2, the option c is added. This increases the value of information acquisition, as
c pays a high number of points in state 1 and a low number in state 2. Thus, the addition
of c may lead subjects to identify the true state with a high degree of accuracy. However,
having done so, half the time they will determine that the state is in fact 2, in which case b
is the best option. Thus, there is potentially a spillovere¤ect of adding c to the choice set
which is to increase the probability of selecting b: It is this violation of monotonicity we will
look for in the data. Matejka and McKay [2015] show that, for a DM with Shannon costs,
such violations are guaranteed for some parameterization of this class of decision problem.
Experiment 1 also provides a rst test for the NIAS and NIAC conditions which charac-
terize the general model. Recall that the NIAS condition requires that subjects make optimal
choices given their revealed posteriors. So, for example, at the posteriors a from DP 1 it
must be the case that the expected utility of a is higher than that of b This implies that
a1(1)50 + 
a












P1(aj1)(50  b1) + P1(aj2)(50  b2)  0
where Pi is the SDSC data generated by DP i:
In DP 1 the NIAS conditions imply two comparisons which can be collapsed into a single
inequality. In DP 2 there are six inequalities to check, not all of which will necessarily bind.
The derivation of these conditions is described in appendix A1 and summarized in table 3.
Table 3: NIAS tests for Experiment 1
DP Comparison Condition
1 N/A P1(aj1)(50  b1) + P 1(aj2)(50  b2)  (100  (b1 + b2)) 0
2 a vs b P2(aj1)(50  b1) + P 2(aj2)(50  b2)  0
2 a vs c P2(aj2)  P 2(aj1)  0
2 b vs a P2(bj1)(b1 50) + P 2(bj2)(b2 50)  0
2 b vs c P2(bj1)(b1 100) + P 2(bj2)b2 0
2 c vs a P2(cj1)  P 2(cj2)  0
2 c vs b P2(cj1)(100  b1)  P 2(cj2)b2 0
NIAC is the condition that guarantees that behavior can be rationalized by an underlying
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cost function. It states that total gross surplus (measured by the function G) cannot be
increased by switching the assignment of information structures from those revealed in the
data: i.e. using the information structure revealed in DP1 in DP2 and visa versa (see Caplin
and Dean [2015] for further details). In appendix 1 we show that (assuming NIAS holds) this
boils down to the condition that
P2(cj!1)  P2(cj!2)  (P1(aj!1)  P1(aj!2))  0:
This essentially implies that the DM be (weakly) more informed when choosing c in DP
2 than when choosing a in DP 1 - a condition which makes intuitive sense: the rewards to
information processing are higher in DP 2 than in DP 1. Notice that these conditions also
imply if the DM chooses to be uninformed in DP 2 - meaning that b is never chosen and
P2(cj!1) = P2(cj!2), then b also cannot be chosen in DP 1.
Together, NIAS and NIAC are necessary and su¢ cient for the data in experiment 1 to
be consistent with the general model.
3.3 Experiment 2: Changing Incentives
Our second experiment is designed to examine how subjects change their attention as incen-
tives change. We do so using the simplest possible design: decision problems consist of two
actions and two equally likely states, with the reward for choosing the correctstate varying
between problems. Table 4 shows the four DPs that were administered in experiment 2.
Payo¤s were in probability points for a prize of $40, with subjects facing 50 repetitions of
each DP. Again, states 1 and 2 were represented by 49 and 51 red balls respectively.
Table 4: Experiment 2
Payo¤s
DP U(a; 1) U(a; 2) U(b; 1) U(b; 2)
3 5 0 0 5
4 40 0 0 40
5 70 0 0 70
6 95 0 0 95
The primary aim of this experiment is to provide estimates of the cost function associated
with information acquisition. However, in order for this to be meaningful it must be the
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case that behavior is rationalizable with some underlying informational cost function. We
therefore begin by testing the NIAS and NIAC conditions which are necessary and su¢ cient
for such a cost function to exist. In this setting these conditions take on a particularly simple
form. NIAS - which guarantees that subjects are using the information they have e¢ ciently
- requires that
Pi(aj1)  Pi(aj2) for i 2 f5; 6; 7; 8g:
This condition simply states that the subject must be more likely to choose the action
a in state 1 (when it pays o¤ a positive amount) than in state 2 (when it does not). If and
only if this condition holds then a (resp. b) is the optimal choice of action given the posterior
probabilities over states when a (b) was chosen. See Caplin and Dean [2015] section E for
the derivation of the NIAS and NIAC conditions for experiments 2 and 3.
NIAC is the condition which ensures that behavior is consistent with some underlying cost
function. In this setting it is equivalent to requiring that subjects become no less accurate
as incentives increase - i.e.
P8(aj1) + P8(bj2)
 P7(aj1) + P7(bj2)
 P6(aj1) + P6(bj2)
 P5(aj1) + P5(bj2)
This condition guarantees that gross payo¤ cannot be increased by reallocation informa-
tion structures across decision problems.
Having established that some rationalizing cost function exists, we can consider what it
looks like. Of particular interest is whether behavior is consistent with Shannon costs. In
order to determine this, we can make use of the ILR condition above. Assuming that utility














Where aj (1) is the posterior probability of state 1 in decision problem j following the
choice of action a (recall that these posteriors can be directly observed in the SDSC data).
Moreover, the symmetry of the Shannon model implies that aj (1) = 
b
j(2).
Thus, while the general model implies only that the probability of making the correct
choice is non-decreasing in reward, the Shannon model implies a very specic rate at which
subjects must improve. E¤ectively, behavior in a single decision problem pins down the
models one free parameter, , which then dictates behavior in all other decision problems.
The class of models introduced in section 2.4 relax this constrain somewhat - allowing for
two parameters rather than one. We can use the data from experiment 2 to t this class of
models in order to determine if provides an improvement over the Shannon assumption.
3.4 Experiment 3: Changing Priors
The third experiment studies the impact of changing prior probabilities. Again we use
the simplest possible setting with two states (47 and 53 red balls respectively)17 and two
acts. Again there are 4 decision problems, each of which is repeated 50 times. Because
this experiment made use of only two payo¤ levels, payment was made in cash, rather than
probability points. Table 5 describes the 4 decision problems with payo¤s denominated in
US Dollars
Table 5: Experiment 3
Payo¤s
DP (1) U(a; 1) U(a; 2) U(b; 1) U(b; 2)
7 0.50 10 0 0 10
8 0.60 10 0 0 10
9 0.75 10 0 0 10
10 0.85 10 0 0 10
Each DP has two acts which pay o¤ $10 in their correct state. The only thing that
changes between the decision problems is the prior probability of state 1, which increases
from 0.5 in DP 7 to 0.85 in DP 10.
The general model has only a limited amount to say about behavior in experiment 3.
NIAC has no bite, as the general model puts no constraint on how information costs change
with changes in prior beliefs. However, NIAS must still hold - subjects must still use whatever
17We used a somewhat easier setting for this experiment (relative to experiment 2) in order to ensure that
most subjects collected some information in the baseline DP 7.
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information they have optimally. For this experiment the NIAS condition implies






Again this condition derives from the necessity that each action be the best option at
the distribution over states conditional on it being chosen.
A natural alternative model is one of base rate neglect (see for example Tversky and
Kahneman [1974]), in which subjects ignore changes in prior probabilities when assessing
alternatives. A DM who ignored the impact of changing priors on their posterior would be
in danger of violating NIAS as (1) increases.
In contrast, the posterior separable class of models puts a lot of structure on behavior
as priors change, as captured by the LIP condition. Figure 2 demonstrates the testable
implications of the LIP condition for experiment 3. First, one observes the posterior beliefs
associated with the choice of a and b in DP 7, when the (1) = 0:5 (panel a). Then, as
the prior probability of state 1 increases, there are only two possible responses. First, if the
prior remains inside the convex hull of the posteriors used at (1) = 0:5 the subject must
use precisely the same posteriors (panel b).18 Second, if the prior moves outside the convex
hull of the posteriors used at (1) = 0:5 the subject should learn nothing, and choose option
18Of course, for Bayesrule to hold, it must also be the case that the unconditional probability of choosing
option a increases.
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a in all trials (panel c).
Figure 2: Locally Invariant Posteriors
Panel a: Posteriors used when
(1) = 0:5
Panel b: Same posteriors are
used if they remain feasible
Panel c: No learning takes place
if posteriors are infeasible
3.5 Experiment 4: Invariance Under Compression
Our nal experiment is designed to test the property of IUC which is inherent in the Shannon
model.19 Consider the set up described in table 6. There are N equally likely states of the
world and two actions, a and b. Action a pays o¤ $10 in states of the world f1; :::N
2
g and
19This experimental design was developed a part of a distinct project on information acquisition in global
games. See Dean et al. [2016].
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zero otherwise, while action b pays o¤ $10 in states fN
1
+ 1; Ng and zero otherwise.






+ 1; ::; N
a 10 0
b 0 10
The predictions of the Shannon model in this environment can be readily determined
from the ILR condition, which shows that posterior beliefs following the choice of each act
depend only on the relative payo¤ the available acts in that state. This implies immediately
that behavior should be equivalent in all states between 1 and N
2
and in all states between
N
2
+ 1 and N . This is a manifestation of the IUC condition.
This illustrates an important behavioral feature of the Shannon model, which is that it
is symmetric. A permutation of prior beliefs and payo¤s across states should lead to the
equivalent permutation of SDSC data, so behavior is essentially invariant to the labelling of
states. The model lacks any sense of perceptual distance, by which some states are harder
to distinguish that others. According to the Shannon model, subjects are no more likely to
make mistakes in states that are close to the threshold of N
2
than those that are far away.
Whether or not this is a reasonable assumption is likely to depend on the task at hand.
We therefore test this implication in two di¤erent decision making environments which di¤er
in the extent to which there is a natural perceptual distance between states. The rst (the
Ballstreatment) makes use of the same interface as experiments 1-3: states are represented
by the number of red balls centered around 50. Subjects in this experiment faced four
di¤erent DPs, each of which was repeated 50 times. DPs varied in the number of possible
states - from 8 to 20 (so, for example, in the 8 state treatment there could be between 47
and 54 red balls, while in the 20 state treatment there could be between 41 and 60 red balls).
Figure 3: Alternative perceptual task
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The second environment (the Letters treatment) makes use of a di¤erent perceptual
task. Subjects are shown a grid of letters, of the type displayed in gure 3. One of these
letters appears more often than the others. We refer to this as the stateletter. The position
of the state letter in the alphabet determines the state: which act pays o¤depends on whether
the state letter is before or after the letter /N . Again, subjects in this treatment faced 50
repetitions of 4 decision problems which varied the number of state letters in each grid
(non-state letters were always repeated 3 times) and the number of possible states (i.e. the
number of possible letters). Table 7 summarizes the various decision problems that go to
make up experiment 4. Subjects either faced DPs 11-14 (i.e. the balls treatment) or 15-17
(the letters treatment).
Table 7: Treatments for Experiment 4
DP Stimuli # States # Letter Repetitions
11 Balls 8 N/A
12 Balls 12 N/A
13 Balls 16 N/A
14 Balls 20 N/A
15 Letters 8 4
16 Letters 12 6
17 Letters 16 7
18 Letters 20 10
4 Implementation and Results
Subjects were recruited from the New York University and Columbia University student
populations.20 At the end of each session, one question was selected at random for payment,
the result of which was added to the show up fee of $10. Subjects usually took between 45
minutes and 1.5 hours to complete a session, depending on the experiment. Instructions are
included in the online appendix.
20Using the Center for Experimental Social Science subject pool at NYU and the Columbia Experimental
Laboratory in the Social Science subject pool at Columbia.
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4.1 Matching Theory to Data
The theoretical implications above are couched in terms of the population distribution of
SDSC - i.e. the true probability of a given subject choosing each possible alternative in each
state of the world. Of course this is not what we observe in our experiment for two reasons.
First, we are only able to make inferences based on estimates of these underlying parameters
from nite samples. Second, in order to generate these samples we will need to aggregate
over decision problems and/or individuals.
Taking the second problem rst - we make use of two types of aggregation in the following
results. First, because we make each subject repeat the same decision problem numerous
times, we can estimate SDSC data at the subject level. Second, we can aggregate over
subjects who have faced the same decision problem which gives us more observations and so
more power. In principle, both of these might be problematic. In the former case, while each
repetition of the decision problem is the same if states are dened by number of red balls, the
actual conguration of red and blue balls vary from trial to trial in order to prevent learning.
It could be that some congurations are easier to understand than others (in extremis, all the
red balls could appear on the left of the screen while all the blue ones appear on the right).
Aggregating across individuals may also cause problems, because di¤erent individuals may
have di¤erent costs of attention.
For most of the tests that we perform this aggregation does not present a problem. For
example, in experiment 1 we look for violations of Monotonicity by studying whether the
probability of choosing b increases when c is introduced to the action set. Consider a DM
for whom monotonicity holds conditional on the di¢ culty of the problem, as represented
by the conguration of dots on the screen. This means that, when sampling from di¤erent
congurations, the distribution of probabilities of b being selected when c was not available
should stochastically dominate that when c is available, and so Monotonicity should hold
in expectation. Similarly, aggregating across subjects for whom Monotonicity holds should
lead to monotonic data.
Two case in which aggregation may cause problems are (i) when we are estimating the
rate at which accuracy responds to incentives, for example when comparing the data to the
Shannon model in experiment 2, and (ii) when testing the LIP condition in experiment 3.
We discuss this issue in more depth in section 5 below.
Once we have done the aggregation, we are still faced with the fact that we only observe
estimates based on nite samples, and so we can only make probabilistic statements about
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whether a given condition holds for the underlying data generating process. Broadly speak-
ing, there are two possible types of test we can perform: we can either look for evidence that
an axiom is violated, or that it holds. Take again the example of Monotonicity, which states
that Pfa;bg(bj2)  Pfa;b;cg(bj2). On the one hand, we could ask whether one can reject the hy-
pothesis that Pfa;bg(bj2) < Pfa;b;cg(bj2). On the other, one could try to reject the hypothesis
that Pfa;bg(bj2)  Pfa;b;cg(bj2). In the former case, a rejection of the hypothesis would provide
convincing evidence that the axiom holds. In the second, it would provide convincing evi-
dence that the axiom is violated. The di¤erence between the two tests is whether the axiom
is given the benet of the doubt, in terms of data which is not statistically distinguishable
from Pfa;bg(bj2) = Pfa;b;cg(bj2). Note that the probability of observing such data should fall
as more data is collected, and so power increases. Typically we will use the former approach
for data aggregated across subjects, where we have enough observations to provide powerful
tests, and the latter for individual level data where we have less power.
Note that the null hypotheses above are dened in terms of inequalities. This is typically
the case for the tests we employ. When testing against a null hypothesis which encompasses
an entire region of the parameter space, there are two possible approaches. The Bayesian
approach is to assign some prior to the parameter space and then update it using the data.
The null is rejected if 95% of the posterior weight falls outside the null region. The frequentist
approach simply treats the null hypothesis as a single point hypothesis placed at the location
in the null region which is the most favorable to the null hypothesis. In this paper we will
use this approach - so, in the case of Monotonicity, we will use a two sided test against the
null of Pfa;bg(bj2) = Pfa;b;cg(bj2), regardless of whether we are taking as the null that the
axiom holds or that it is violated.
When aggregate data is used, standard errors are corrected for clustering at the subject
level.
A further potential issue is the fact that attention costs may vary over the course of the
experiment due to fatigue or learning e¤ects. We discuss this issue in section 5.1.
4.2 Experiment 1: Testing for Responsive Attention
Table 8 summarizes the results of the Monotonicity tests from experiment 1. The rst panel
reports the probability of choosing action b in state 1 with and without c available, and the
results of a statistical test to determine whether the latter is higher that the former. The
second panel repeats the exercise for P (bj2). The nal column reports the fraction of subjects
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who show a signicant violation of monotonicity. 28 subjects took part in this experiment,
evenly divided across the 4 treatments.
Table 8: Results of Experiment 121
P (bj1) P (bj2)
Treat N fa; bg fa; b; cg Prob fa; bg fa; b; cg Prob % Subjects
1 7 2.9 6.8 0.52 50.6 59.8 0.54 29
2 7 5.7 14.7 0.29 21.1 63.1 0.05 43
3 7 9.5 5.0 0.35 21.4 46.6 0.06 29
4 7 1.1 0.8 0.76 19.9 51.7 0.02 57
Total 28 4.8 6.6 0.52 28.3 55.6 <0.01 39
Aggregating across individuals and treatments (nal row), we nd a signicant violation
of monotonicity in the direction predicted by models of rational inattention. The probabil-
ity of choosing b in state 2 increases from 28.3% to 55.6% following the introduction of c,
signicant at the 1% level. The increase in the choice of b in state 1 is small and insigni-
cant. At the individual level, 39% of subjects show a signicant violation of monotonicity.
Disaggregating by treatment, we see that the point estimate of P (bj2) increases with the
introduction of c in all treatments, signicantly so (at the 10% level) in treatments 2-4.
Table 9 reports the results of the NIAS tests for experiment 1 using aggregate data.22
The rst column reports the mean value for the LHS of the tests described in table 3. Recall
that the NIAS condition requires each of these to be positive. The second column reports the
probability associated with a test of the hypothesis that this value is equal to zero. Five of the
seven tests provide strong evidence in favor of NIAS with point estimates signicantly greater
than zero. The two remaining tests have estimates which are not signicantly di¤erent from
21P values from a logit regression of the choice of option b on dummies representing whether or not c was
present and whether the state was 1 or 2. Standard errors clustered at the individual level.








 100 + (b1 + b2)
where 1(choose_a) is a dummy which takes the value 1 if a is chosen, 1(state_i) is a dummy which takes
the value 1 if the state is i and P (i) is the empirical frequencey of state i. Averaging over these values
provides an estimate of the LHS of the rst NIAS test described in table 3. P values were found using
bootstrapping with standard errors clustered at the individual level.
Data for other rows constructed using the same method.
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zero. In the comparison between a and c in DP 2 the point estimate is actually negative -
though not signicantly so. This implies that people were choosing a when in fact it would
have provided (marginally) higher expected utility to choose c. One possible explanation for
this is a form of certainty biasfor probability points: subjects may have liked the fact that
a provides a sure thingof 50 points, while c is risky
Table 9: NIAS Tests for Experiment 1
Aggregate Data
Test Est. P
NIAS DP 1 0.30 0.41
NIAS DP 2 a vs b 5.46 0.00
NIAS DP 2 a vs c -0.02 0.31
NIAS DP 2 b vs a 1.07 0.06
NIAS DP 2 b vs c 25.57 0.00
NIAS DP 2 c vs a 0.47 0.00
NIAS DP 2 c vs b 30.66 0.00
The NIAC condition requires that (P2(cj!1) P2(cj!2)) (P1(aj!1)  P1(aj!2)) is greater
than zero. In the aggregate data the expected value of this expression is 0.234, signicantly
di¤erent from 0 at the 5% level.23
At the individual level we observe only a small number of signicant violations of NIAS
or NIAC. Of the 28 tests of NIAS in DP 1 we nd 3 violations. In DP 2 of the 168 tests we
nd 6 violations. For NIAC, we nd 2 signicant violations in 28 tests.
4.3 Experiment 2: Changing Incentives
We next report the results from experiment 2 in which we examine subjectsresponses as
we change incentives. 52 subjects took part in this experiment.
We begin by testing the NIAS and NIAC conditions which are necessary and su¢ cient
for the general model. Table 10 reports the results of the NIAS test - which requires that
the probability of choosing a in state 1 must be higher than in state 2 - using aggregate
data. It shows the probability of choosing a in each state for each decision problem, and
the probability of failing to reject the null that NIAS is violated. The aggregate data rmly
23Point estimates and standard errors calculated as in the NIAS tests above.
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supports the NIAS condition.
Table 10: NIAS Test from Experiment 224
DP Pj(aj1) Pj(aj2) Prob
3 0.74 0.40 0.00
4 0.76 0.34 0.00
5 0.78 0.33 0.00
6 0.78 0.28 0.00
Figure 4 shows the probability of choosing the correctact in each DP, averaging across
all subjects, which allows us to test the NIAC condition which states that this probability
should be non-decreasing in the reward level. The point estimates obey this pattern, with
accuracy increasing from 67% at the 5 probability point level to 75% at the 95 probability
point level. Most of the di¤erences between DPs are signicant at the 10% level.25
24Results of a logistic regression of choice of action a on a dummy for state 1. P value reported is that
associated with the state 1 dummy. Standard errors clustered at the subject level.
25Estimates and standard errors produced using a logit regression of correct choice on treatement, with
standard errors clustered at the individual level. The success rate at the 5 probabilty point level is signi-
cantly di¤erent from that of 95 prob. point level at <0.1%, and di¤erent from the 40 and 70 levels at 10%.
The 40 probability point level is signicantly di¤erent from the 95 level at 10%. The 70 probability point
level is not signicantly di¤erent from either the 40 or the 95 level.
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Figure 4: Probability of Correct Response by Decision Problem
Table 11 reports the individual level data, and in particular the fraction of subjects who
exhibit signicant violations of the NIAS condition, the NIAC condition, both or neither.
81% of subjects show no signicant violations of either condition.26
26We checked the NIAC condition and the NIAS conditions separately for each individual. The NIAS
condition was tested by simply estimating a robust OLS model regressing probability of choice of action a
on state. If the coe¢ cient was signicantly negative that is considered a signicant violation of NIAS.
NIAC was checked by estimating a GLM regression. In this model a dummy for correct response was
regressed against dummies for the three higher incentive levels. We then preformed an F-test of the joint
restrictions that (i) the dummy on to 40 probability point level was greater than or equal to 0, (ii) that the
dummy on the 70 point level was greater than or equal to that on the 40 point level and (iii) that the dummy
on the 95 level was greater than equal to that on the 70% level. Subjects were categorized as violating NIAC
if these restrictions were jointly rejected.
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Table 11 implies that most of our subjects do not have signicant violations of the NIAS
and NIAC conditions and therefore act as if they maximize relative to some underlying cost
function. Figure 5 gives some idea of the heterogeneity of those costs across subjects. It
graphs the probability of choosing the correct action at the 5 point level vs the 95 point
level for each subject. The fact that most points fall above the 45 degree line is the dening
feature of rational inattention. However, within this constraint there is still a great deal
of variation. Our data set includes high xed cost, high marginal cost individuals who
gather little information regardless of reward: their accuracy is near 50% for the low and
high reward levels. It includes low xed costsubjects who have accuracy close to 100%,
even in the low reward decision problem. Finally there are high xed cost, low marginal
costsubjects, who actively adjust their accuracy as a function of reward.
Figure 5: Individual Accuracy 5 Point vs 95
Point Reward
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We next examine the extent to which subjects behave as if their costs are in line with
the Shannon model. Figure 6 shows the estimated costs  from each decision problem and
in each state using aggregate data. The Shannon model would predict that these should
be equal. As we can see this is not the case: estimated costs are increasing in reward level
- the estimated costs are signicantly di¤erent at the 0.01% level between the 5 and 95
point reward levels. The fact that estimated costs are increasing implies that subjects are
not increasing their accuracy fast enough in response to changing incentives relative to the
predictions of the Shannon model.27
Figure 6: Estimated Costs
We next examine whether the class of cost functions introduced in section 2.4 does a
better job of tting the data. Figure 7 shows actual vs predicted accuracy at each reward
level for the Shannon model and the model dened by the posterior separable cost function
Tf;g.28 Since the Shannon model is nested within the class of Tf;g functions, this broader
27Cost estimates and standard errors based on an OLS regression of response on treatment and state
dummies, which were then converted into cost estimates using the method discussed in section 3.3. Standard
errors are clustered at the individual level.
28Models are tted to the data by maximum likelihood. The error bounds were found through bootstrap
resampling of participants and reestimation of the parameters of the models. The error bars on the Shannon
model are very small for the low incentive level, because the model essentially pins down the intercept while
leaving the slope free. Therefore, a wide range of prections for the incentive level ninety-ve will come from
a set of parameters which only produce a very narrow range of predictions at incentive level ve. The data
for the higher incentive levels are then very precisely pinning down the predictions at low incentive levels
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class must weakly provided a better t of the data. However, criteria that punish models
for having additional parameters still suggest rejecting Shannon in favor of the broader
parametrized class. For example the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) is lower for the
Tf;g model than for the Shannon model.29
Figure 7
At the individual level we also see signicant violations of the Shannon model. Figure
8 shows a scatter plot of the predicted vs actual accuracy for each subject in the 70 point
DP, where the prediction is made using the Shannon model and the accuracy displayed at
the 40 point level.30 The scatter plot shows more subjects below the 45 degree line (i.e.
are less accurate than predicted) than above (more accurate than predicted).31 For each
even if the low incentive level data does not match those predictions well.
29The AIC is 12750.67 for the Shannon model and 12424.41 for the Tf;g model.
30We use these two reward levels to illustrate our ndings because the predictions derived from more
extreme comparisons typically cluster at the extremes, making the associated graph hard to interpret.
31For the analysis described in this paragraph we drop observations in which the point estimate for accuracy
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subject and pair of reward levels we can test for signicant violations of the Shannon model
which indicate too slowadjustment relative to the Shannon model (i.e. the accuracy at
the higher reward is lower than it should be given the accuracy at the lower reward level),
and for violations which indicate too fastadjustment (accuracy at the higher reward level
is higher than it should be).32 Of the 221 possible comparisons, we nd 66 violations of the
too slowvariety and 8 of the too fastvariety. 21 subjects exhibit too slowviolations only,
4 exhibit too fastviolationsonly, 2 have examples of both and 21 examples of neither.
Figure 8: Predicted vs actual accuracy in the 70% payo¤
treatment
at the lower reward level is below 50%, as this does not allow us to recover the cost parameter of the Shannon
model and so make predictions for the higher cost level.
32For each person and each incentive level pair we regress correctness on incentive level and a dummy for the
higher incentive level with no constant using a logit regression. Note that a logit regression of correctness on
incentive level with no constant is equivalent to tting a Shannon model in this case. Signicant coe¢ cients
on the high incentive dummy mean signicant violations of Shannon. Positive coe¢ cients mean that accuracy
is responding too fast while negative coe¢ cients mean it is responding too slow.
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It could be that the violations of Shannon we observe are driven by those subjects that
do not satisfy the conditions of the general model - i.e. violate NIAS or NIAC. In order to
explore this possibility we repeat our analysis dropping such subjects and report the results
in Appendix A2. We still nd widespread and systematic violations of the Shannon model
when focusing only on subjects whose behavior is rationalizable using some cost function.
4.4 Experiment 3: Changing Priors
We rst examine the extent to which the 54 subjects in experiment 3 obeyed NIAS. Table 12
shows the aggregate probability of choosing act a in state 2, the resulting constraint on the
probability of choosing a in state 1, and the related probability in the data. The nal column
shows the probability of failing to reject the null hypothesis that NIAS is violated in the
aggregate data. Broadly speaking, NIAS holds at the aggregate level: the point estimates for
P (aj1) are at or above the constraint for all decision problems, signicantly so for decision
problems 7-9.
Table 12: NIAS Test33
DP Pj(aj2) Constraint on Pj(aj1) Pj(aj1) Prob
7 0.29 0.29 0.77 0.000
8 0.38 0.39 0.88 0.000
9 0.40 0.80 0.90 0.045
10 0.51 0.91 0.91 0.538
This pattern is repeated at the individual level, where we see only a small number of
subjects exhibiting signicant violations of NIAS, as reported in table 13. Thus, we see little
evidence of base rate neglect in this data.
Table 13: Individual Level NIAS violations34
Decision problem 7 8 9 10
Prior 0.5 0.6 0.75 0.85
% Signicant Violations 0 2 2 11
We next study the degree to which our data supports the predictions of the posterior
separable model in the form of the LIP condition. In order to do so, we rst divide subjects
33Tests based on an OLS regression of choice of action on state for each treatment to obtain estimates of
Pj(aj2) and Pj(aj1). Standard errors clustered at the individual level. These estimates then used in a test
of the linear restriction implied by the NIAS model.
34Tests based on the same method reported for the aggregate data in table 13.
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based on the estimated posteriors in DP 7, in which both states are equally likely. The
important distinction is where the posterior associated with the choice of action a falls
relative to the priors for DPs 8-10. Table 14 shows this categorization.
Table 14: Categorization Based
on Posteriors from DP 7





The rst prediction of the posterior separable model is that, in DP i with prior i(1),
subjects who use a posterior a7(1) < i(1) should exclusively choose action a, while those
with a7(1) > i(1) should choose both a and b, where 
a
7 refers to the posteriors revealed in
DP 7 given the choice of a. Table 15 tests this no learningprediction. The top panel divides
subjects into those who have a threshold (i.e. posterior belief from DP 7) above i(1), and
those for whose threshold is below i(1) for 8(1) = 0:6, 9 = 0:75 and 10 = 0:85. For
each of these decision problems, and each of these groups, it then reports the fraction of
subjects who exclusively choose a. The second panel repeats the exercise but allows for
some mistakes on the part of the subject by replacing the condition never choose awith
the condition choose a less than 3 times(out of 50) in the DP.




Never choose b a7(1) < i(1) 35% 27% 29%
a7(1)  i(1) 0% 7% 13%
Choose b< 3 a7(1) < i(1) 50% 27% 37%
a7(1)  i(1) 3% 7% 25%
Table 15 shows that, while it does not perfectly match our data, the no learningpredic-
tion does produce the correct comparative statics. In each DP, around 30% of the subject
who should exclusively choose a do so, higher than the equivalent fraction for those who
should be choosing both a and b. These di¤erences are signicant at the 5% level for DP 8
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and 9, but not for DP 10.
The second part of the LIP condition states that, in each DP, subjects who are still
actively gathering information35 should use the same posteriors as they did in DP 7. Figure
9 tests this hypothesis. Panel a focusses on DP 8. It reports data exclusively on subjects
who should be choosing both a and b in this DP according to the posterior separable model
(i.e. those for whom a7 > 0:6). It shows the estimated posteriors associated with the choice
of action a and b in DP 7 and DP 8 aggregating across all such subjects. The LIP prediction
is that these posteriors should be the same. Panels b and c repeat this analysis for DPs
9 and 10. Figure 9 shows that LIP holds relatively well when comparing the 0.5 and 0.6
posteriors: neither the posterior associated with the choice of a nor the one associated with
b is signicantly di¤erent across the two decision problems. However, LIP starts to break
down as the prior becomes more skewed: The probability of state 2 given the choice of b (i.e.
bj(2)) is signicantly lower when the prior is 0:75 or 0:85 than when it is 0:5 (P<0.01)).
36
35 i.e. those for whom their posterior beliefs from DP 7 fall above the prior in that DP.
36Tests based on OLS regressions with standard errors clustered at the individual level.
35
Figure 9a: Subjects with threshold
above 0.6
Figure 9b: Subjects with thresholds
above 0.75
Figure 9c: Subjects with threshold
above 0.85
4.5 Experiment 4: Symmetry
23 subjects took part in the Ballstreatment and 24 in the Letterstreatment for experiment
4. The results are summarized in gures 10 and 11, which show the probability of choosing
36
the correct action as a function of the state for each DP and each treatment.
Figure 10: Balls Treatment
Figure 11: Letters Treatment
These gures show clear and systematic violations of symmetry in the Ballstreatment
but not in the Letterstreatment. Figure 10 shows that, for DPs 11-14 subjects were more
likely to make mistakes in states near the threshold of 50. This observation is conrmed by
regression analysis, which nds a signicant and positive correlation between distance from
threshold and probability correct for each DP. No such relationship is observed in the letters
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treatment.37 While there are variations in the probability correct across states,38 these are
not signicantly correlated with distance from the threshold of N for any decision problem
or in aggregate.
5 Discussion
Our overall conclusions from this set of experiments are (1) that experimental subjects clearly
adapt their attention strategy in response to incentives; (2) that they do so broadly in line
with the general model of rational inattention, at least in the aggregate data and in the simple
environments we consider; (3) that the Shannon model has some signicant di¢ culties in
explaining our data, both in terms of the relationship it predicts between changing rewards
and information gathering, and its unrealistic symmetry properties; and (4) the broader
class of PS models improves on Shannon by dropping the symmetry property and allowing
for a better t of the relationship between incentives and information gathering; (5) the
LIP condition which characterizes such models is violated but also appears to have some
empirical bite.
5.1 Aggregation and Order E¤ects
In this section we discuss some of the issues which could e¤ect these conclusions. In par-
ticular, could aggregation and order e¤ects be responsible for some of the results we nd,
and so be the reason we have rejected some models? As discussed in section 4.1, there are
two forms of aggregation which might be problematic: across individuals with di¤erent cost
functions, and across decision problems with di¤erent degrees of di¢ culty. Of the two, we
expect the former to be the primary source of variability. Given the large number of balls
on the display, the law of large numbers means that we do not expect signicant variation in
costs across repetitions. For example, di¢ culty may be related to the degree to which balls
37Results from an OLS regression. A distance measure was constructed measuring the absolute distance
between the state and the threshold. In the Balls treatment this is equal to the di¤erence between the
number of balls on the screen and 50. For the letters treatment this is the number of letters between the
state letter and N. Choice is then regressed on distance, which action is correct, and DP separately for balls
and letters treatments, aggregating across decision problem. Standard errors clustered at the subject level.
The estimated coe¢ cient on distance is 0.032 (P<0.001) in the balls treatment and 0.001 (P=0.694) in the
letters treatment.
38The main di¤erence in accuracy across states is due to subjects on average being more accurate in states
below N than above. The reason for this is that subjects who always gave the same response overwhelmingly
chose action a, rather than b:
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clustering by color, the variance of which will be low when the number of balls is large.
Of the tests that we report, those that are potentially a¤ected by aggregation issues are
the test of the ILR condition in experiment 2 and the test of LIP in experiment 3. In both
cases we report individual level as well as aggregate results. In the former case it is true that
variability in information costs could lead to violations of the predictions of the Shannon
model in the direction we observe. Data generated by aggregating across di¤erent cost levels
in each decision problem would respond more slowly to incentives than the Shannon model
would predict under the assumption of no cost variation. However, if such variations cause
the model to fail at the individual level in an experimental situation where we believe costs
to be relatively stable, they are likely to cause trouble for other applications as well. It is
hard to think of an application of the model which does not require some aggregation of
data.
In the case of the LIP condition, variability in costs would also bias the test towards a
rejection of the no learningcondition: for example a subject who faced a particularly low
cost realization for (say) (1) = 0:6 might seek information and choose action b, even if they
would choose to be uninformed at average information costs. Thus the success rate we nd
should be treated as a lower bound.
A further question is whether we nd evidence of order e¤ects in our data - i.e. evidence
that subjects performance changes through the experiment due to, for example, learning
e¤ects or fatigue. Our design randomizes the order in which subjects face decision problems,
which has two advantages. First, we can estimate the impact of order on performance, and
second, such e¤ects should wash out in the aggregate data. Order e¤ects are of most interest
in experiments 2 and 3, in which they could have a substantial e¤ect on our conclusions.
Appendix A3 reports the result of regressions of accuracy (i.e. the probability of picking
the rewarding action) on order (i.e. in which block the question occurred between 1 and 4)
while controlling for the type of question and clustering standard errors at the subject level.
We nd signicant order e¤ects in experiment 2 but not in experiment 3. In experiment 2
subjects were more accurate in the rst block. No other di¤erences were signicant. These
order e¤ects could lead to some of the individual level violations of the NIAC and ILR
conditions we observe. To the extent that there are undetected order e¤ects in experiment
3, they may explain some of the failures of the no learningprediction discussed in Table 16
However, they should not lead to the signicant violations of LIP we see in gure 9.
We note that we do not necessarily see the potential presence of order e¤ects as problem
with our experimental design. Rather, it tells us when and how models of rational inattention
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can be applied. If people exhibit signicant uctuations in the cost of e¤ort due to, for
example, fatigue, this means that the general model may work well in making aggregate
predictions but be less e¤ective in making predictions at an individual level, unless these
uctuations can be controlled for.
6 Related Literature
Many papers have established the importance of attention limits in economically interesting
contexts, including consumer choice,39 nancial markets,40 and voting behavior.41 There
have, however, been far fewer papers that have attempted to test models of inattention. In the
experimental literature, Caplin et al. [2011] and Geng [2016] test models of sequential search
in the satiscingtradition of Simon [1955]. While these papers nd evidence of satiscing
in the context of choice amongst a large numbers of easily understood alternatives, such
models are clearly not suitable for understanding behavior when faced with a small number
of di¢ cult to understand alternatives, as we examine in this paper. Indeed, as satiscing
behavior can be optimal given a particular information cost function (see Caplin et al. [2011]),
the satiscing model can be seen as a special case of the models studied here.
Gabaix et al. [2006] test a dynamic model of information acquisition in which agents are
partially myopic, and so not fully rational, which they label a model of directed cognition.
Unlike out paper, search costs are imposed explicitly either through nancial costs or time
limits. Instead, our aim is to learn about the intrinsic costs to information acquisition that
decision makers face. Gabaix et al. [2006] also make use of a very di¤erent data set, looking at
the sequence in which data is collected using Mouselab,42 rather than the resulting pattern of
stochastic choice. The optimal sequence of data acquisition in their set up cannot be readily
determined, meaning that it is hard to tell whether their directed cognition model describes
the data better than a fully rational alternative.43 More recent work (Taubinsky [2013],
Goecke et al. [2013], Khaw et al. [2016]) has also focussed on the dynamics of information
39Chetty et al. [2009], Hossain and Morgan [2006], Allcott and Taubinsky. [2015], Lacetera et al. [2012],
Pope [2009], Santos et al. [2012].
40DellaVigna and Pollet [2007], Huberman [2015], Malmendier and Shanthikumar [2007], Bernard and
Thomas [1989], Hirshleifer et al. [2009].
41Shue and Luttmer [2009], Ho and Imai [2008].
42An earlier literature used tools such as Mouselab and eye tracking to document what information in-
dividuals gather during the process of choice - see Payne et al. [1993], and Brocas et al. [2014] for a more
recent application of these methods to choice in strategic settings. These papers have not genrally used the
data to compare behavior to rational benchmarks.
43Though see Sanjurjo [2017].
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acquisition.
A third set of papers (Pinkovskiy [2009] and Cheremukhin et al. [2015]), estimate the
Shannon model on experimental data sets in which people make binary choices between
gambles. These papers make use of standard stochastic choice data - modeling inconsistent
choices as mistakes caused by lack of information - and not the SDSC data we introduce in
this paper. While they typically nd the Shannon model does well relative to other, non-
rational models of stochasticity, they do not focus on the specic features that characterize
this model within the general rational inattention class, such as ILR and LIP. For example,
Cheremukhin et al. [2015] reports that accuracy increases with incentives - e¤ectively a test
of NIAC, which is a property of all models of rational inattention. There is no test of the
specic properties which characterize the Shannon model.
In contrast to the relatively small amount of work in economics, there is a huge literature
in psychology which has used SDSC data in order to understand the processes underlying
perception and choice. Many of these studies are used to test the implications of the sequen-
tial sampling class of models, in which agents gain information over time, allowing them
to arrive at their nal decision.44 Other work has focussed on testing the SDT paradigm
introduced in section 2.2.1. See Yu [2014] and Ratcli¤ et al. [2016] for recent reviews, and
Krajbich et al. [2011] for a discussion of the application of sequential sampling models to
economic choice. Some of these studies are similar the design of experiments 2 and 3 in this
paper - varying the reward level and prior beliefs in a choice between two uncertain alterna-
tives. Typically these studies focus on subjects ability to successfully complete perceptual
tasks.45 and have design elements that make them unsuitable for our purpose - for example
a lack of explicit incentives (e.g. van Ravenzwaaij et al. [2012] study the e¤ect of changing
priors in an unincentivized task) or a focus on a specic clinical population (for example
Reddy et al. [2015] look at the response to incentives in schizophrenic subjects). To our
knowledge, none of these studies perform the specic tests of the various classes of rational
inattention model that we describe here. Neither does the literature include an equivalent
of our experiments 1 and 4.
44See for example Ratcli¤ and McKoon [2008] for an introduction to this class of models.
45Probably most popular are dot motion tasks (Britten et al. [1992]), in which participants are shown
screens with numerous moving dots and are asked to determine the overall direction of motion of the group.
Ratcli¤ et al. [2016] reviews several studies of this type. Another common perceptual task is the lexical
di¤erentiation task (e.g. Zandt et al. [2000]) in which participants are asked to di¤erentiate between letters
or words based on some given rule. The last common experimental approach is static geometric estimate
(e.g. Ratcli¤ and Smith [2004]). In these studies, participants are asked to categorize static images based on
some visual characteristic such as distance, length, or orientation. It is this static geometric discrimination
task that the experiments in this study most closely resembles, although to our knowledge no psychology
study has used our precise perceptual task.
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7.1 Appendix A1: NIAS and NIAC for Experiment 1
NIAS demands that, for each action a 2 A chosen with positive probabilityX
!2

(!)P (aj!) (u(a; !)  u(a0; !))  0
for every other available alternative a0 2 A:
For notational convenience, we will use P to denote the SDSC data arising from the
decision problem fa:bg and P^ for that arising from fa; b; cg:
Taking the former DP rst, the comparison of a to b requires
P (aj!1)(50  b1) + P (aj!2)(50  b2)  0
while the comparison of b to a requires
(1  P (aj!1)) (b1   50) + (1  P (aj!2)) (b2   50))  0
or
P (aj!1)(50  b1) + P (aj!2)(50  b2)  100  (b1 + b2)
As, in all our treatments, b1 + b2 < 100 it is only the latter condition that binds.
In the DP in which the DM chooses from fa; b; cg the comparison of a to b again requires
P^ (aj!1)(50  b1) + P^ (aj!2)(50  b2)  0
while the comparison of a to c demands
P^ (aj!1) (50  100) + P^ (aj!2) (50)  0)
50

P^ (aj!2)  P^ (aj!1)

 0
) P^ (aj!2)  P^ (aj!1)
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The comparison of b to a gives
P^ (bj!1)(b1   50) + P^ (bj!2)(b2   50)  0
And that of b to c
P^ (bj!1)(b1   100) + P^ (bj!2)b2  0
The comparison of c to a gives
P^ (cj!1) (100  50) + P^ (cj!2) ( 50)  0)
50

P^ (cj!1)  P^ (cj!2)

 0
) P^ (cj!1)  P^ (cj!2)
While the comparison of c to b gives
P^ (cj!1)(100  b1)  P^ (cj!2)b2  0
Note that not all of these constraints will hold simultaneously.
NIAC requires that the total surplus generated from the observed matching of informa-
tion structures to decision problems is greater than that generated by switching revealed
information structures across decision problems
G(; fa; bg ; ) +G(; fa; b; cg ; ^) (2)
 G(; fa; bg ; ^) +G(; fa; b; cg ; )
where  is the revealed posterior from data P generated from choice set fa; bg and ^
is the revealed information structure from data set P^ generated from choice set fa; b; cg.
See Caplin and Dean [2015] for a formal denition of the revealed information structure,
but essentially it assumes that the DM used an information structure which consists of the
posteriors described in equation 1 for each chosen act, with the probability of receiving that
posterior given by the (unconditional) probability of choosing the associated act.
Assuming NIAS holds, we can calculate G(; fa; bg ; ) directly from the data: these are
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just the gross utilities derived from SDSC observed in each DP, so
G(; fa; bg ; ) = (P (a \ !1) + P (a \ !2)) 50 + P (b \ !1)b1 + P (b \ !2)b2
= 0:5 [(P (aj!1) + P (aj!2)) 50 + P (bj!1)b1 + P (bj!2)b2]
where we have used the fact that (1) = (2) = 0:5. Similarly for G(; fa; b; cg ; ^) we
have
G(; fa; b; cg ; ^) = 0:5
h
P^ (aj!1) + P^ (aj!2)

50 + P^ (bj!1)b1 + P^ (bj!2)b2 + P^ (cj!1)100
i
Recall that G(; fa; bg ; ^) is the hypothetical utility generated from using information
structure ^ in DP fa; bg. This means that we have to calculate the optimal action to take
from the posteriors ^a, ^b and ^c associated with acts a b and c in the DP in which ^ is
observed. Note that, assuming NIAS hold, it must be the case that a is still optimal from
^a and b is still optimal from ^b in the new problem. The question is therefore only whether
the DM should choose a or b from ^c. Note, however, that NIAS implies that
^c(!1)100  ^c(!1)50 + (1  ^c(!1))50
) ^c(!1)  1
2
which in turn implies that it is optimal to choose a rather than b from this posterior. We
therefore have
G(; fa; bg ; ^) =

P^ (aj!1) + P^ (aj!2) + P^ (cj!1) + P^ (cj!2)

50
+P^ (bj!1)b1 + P^ (bj!2)b2
Similarly, in order to calculate G(; fa; b; cg ; ) we need to gure out the optimal choice
of action from a and b associated with the choice of a and b in fa; b; cg. Again from NIAS
it is obvious that it must be the case that b(!1)  12 , and so it cannot be optimal to choose
c from this posterior. NIAS also implies that it must be better to choose b rather than a
from this posterior. Further, note that by Bayes rule we have
P (a)a(!1) + (1  P (a))b(!1) = 1
2
Thus, as b(!1)  12 it must be the case that a(!1)  12 , meaning that c is weakly
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optimal from this posterior. This means that
G(; fa; b; cg ; ) = P (bj!1)b1 + P (bj!2)b2 + P (aj!1)100
Plugging these into inequality 2 and cancelling gives
(P (aj!1) + P (aj!2)) 50 + P^ (cj!1)100


P^ (cj!1) + P^ (cj!2)

50 + P (aj!1)100
or
P^ (cj!1)  P^ (cj!2)  P (aj!1)  P (aj!2)
This expression has a natural interpretation when one notes that NIAS implies that
P^ (cj!1)  P^ (cj!2) and P (aj!1)  P (aj!2): it implies that the DM has to be more informed
when choosing c in DP fa; b; cg than when choosing a in DP (a; bg. In particular, if the DM
chooses to gather no information in the former problem, meaning that P^ (cj!1) = P^ (cj!2),
it must also be the case that P (aj!1) = P (aj!2), and so the DM is uninformed in the rst
problem. NIAS in turn implies that in such cases a must be chosen exclusively in fa; bg.
7.2 Appendix A2: Shannon without Subjects who Violate NIAS
or NIAC
In this appendix we rerun the analysis testing the Shannon model using the data from
experiment 2 while excluding those subjects who exhibit signicant violations on NIAS and
NIAC. We will refer to the remainder as consistentsubjects.
Figure A2.1 shows estimated costs  using aggregate data , replicating the analysis of
gure 6. Again, we see that costs are signicantly higher at the 95 point level than at the 5
point level, indicating that adjustment is again too slow relative to the Shannon model
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Figure A2.1: Estimated Costs - Consistent Subjects Only
Figure A2.2 replicates the analysis of gure 7 using only consistent subjects. Again we
see that the models from the broader Tf;g class outperform the Shannon model, with an
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AIC of 9852 vs 10123 for the Shannon model
Figure A2.2: Consistent subjects only
Figure A2.3 replicates the individual level analysis of gure 8. As with the equivalent
analysis in section 4.3, we drop observations in which accuracy at the lower reward level is
below 50%. Of the 178 possible comparisons, we nd 42 violations of the too slowvariety
and 5 of the too fastvariety. 15 of subjects exhibit too slowviolations only, 3 exhibit too
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fast violationsonly and 21 have examples of neither.
Figure A2.3: Predicted vs actual accuracy in the 70%
payo¤ treatment
7.3 Appendix A3: Order E¤ects
Tables A3.1 and A3.2 report the result of regressions of accuracy (i.e. the probability of
picking the rewarding action) on order (i.e. in which block the question occurred, between 1
and 4) controlling for the type of question and clustering standard errors at the subject level
for experiments 2 and 3. In both cases the excluded category is block 1 - i.e. the rst set
of questions answered. The lower and upper CI refer to the upper and lower bounds to the
95% condence interval, while Prob refers to the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis
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that the coe¢ cient is equal to zero.
Table A3.1: Order E¤ects - Experiment 2
Block Coe¢ cient Lower CI Upper CI Prob
2 -0.05 -0.09 -0.00 0.04
3 -0.07 -0.11 -0.03 0.00
4 -0.06 -0.11 -0.02 0.03
Table A3.2: Order E¤ects - Experiment 3
Block Coe¢ cient Lower CI Upper CI Prob
2 -0.01 -0.05 0.04 0.81
3 -0.02 -0.07 0.02 0.34
4 -0.02 -0.08 0.02 0.19
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